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Nearly  30  years  ago,  human  immunodeficiency  virus 
(HIV) and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) 
emerged  as  a  new  infection/disease  and  have  since 
been a major concern for public health worldwide due 
its  associated  morbidity  and  mortality.  Considerable 
research and efforts have been undertaken to find and 
implement the best ways to prevent the spread of HIV 
and cure the disease AIDS. While there is still no effec-
tive vaccine, prevention programmes targeted at reduc-
ing  risky  behaviours  have  helped  prevent  the  feared 
explosion of the epidemic in European Union (EU) and 
European Economic Area (EEA) countries. In addition, 
development  of  new  antiretroviral  drugs  and  early 
treatment  of  newly  detected  cases  have  contributed 
considerably to the reduction in associated morbidity 
and  mortality  since  the  mid-1990s.  Still,  there  is  no 
effective cure yet and while antiretroviral treatment is 
improving quality of life, there are concerns about the 
increasing number of HIV infections in certain groups, 
for example, among men who have sex with men (MSM) 
in several EU countries [1] and the fact that the number 
of other sexually transmitted infections (STIs) is also 
increasing in this group [1,2]. 
A year ago, a special theme issue of Eurosurveillance 
highlighted  specific  aspects  of  HIV  and  other  STI  in 
MSM. Today’s issue of the journal draws attention to 
the latest figures on HIV/AIDS in EU/EEA countries that 
were released on World AIDS Day 2010 (1 December) 
in  a  report  on  HIV/AIDS  surveillance  in  Europe  in 
2009,  published  by  the  European  Centre  for  Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC) [3,4]. They demonstrate 
that in 2009, more than 4,500 newly diagnosed AIDS 
cases were reported by 27 EU/EEA countries; in addi-
tion, nearly 26,000 diagnosed cases of HIV infection 
were  reported  by  28  such  countries.  Overall,  AIDS 
is  decreasing  in  almost  all  EU/EEA  countries,  except 
in  some  eastern  European  countries,  and  this  trend 
reflects the wide availability of antiretroviral treatment 
and care. 
In  the  general  population  the  rate  of  HIV  infection 
remains  relatively  low,  but  infection  rates  are  high 
in  certain  population  groups,  e.g.  MSM,  individuals 
from  countries  with  generalised  HIV  epidemics,  and 
injecting drug users, with the largest increase in HIV 
infections among MSM.  
The  drivers  of  the  HIV/AIDS  epidemics  are  remark-
ably distinct between EU/EEA countries: while in many 
countries MSM are the most important risk group, in 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, injecting drug 
users are the main risk group. Knowledge about these 
drivers is of utmost importance in designing effective 
preventive strategies. 
In 2009, the number of cases of HIV infection increased 
in  16  countries,  while  it  decreased  in  only  12,  when 
compared  with  2004  data.  These  figures  –  together 
with the fact that an estimated 30% of infected persons 
are unaware of their HIV infection [5] and may not take 
the  necessary  precautions  (such  as  practicing  safer 
sex) to prevent transmission to others – show why HIV/
AIDS remains an important public health issue and will 
stay in the focus of ECDC’s attention.  
HIV  testing,  early  diagnosis  and  access  to  treatment 
are key strategies for HIV/AIDS prevention. Individuals 
who are unaware of their infection are at risk of pro-
gression  of  the  disease,  severe  complications  and 
possibly  death  from  AIDS,  as  they  cannot  benefit 
from treatment.  There is growing evidence that wide-
spread access to treatment may reduce HIV incidence 
by reducing viral load at population level [6,7]. In addi-
tion,  a  meta-analysis  showed  that  people  diagnosed 
early may be less likely to transmit the virus [8].
The paper by Likitavicius and Van de Laar in this issue 
[3] also highlights the considerably high proportion of 
so-called ‘late presenters’ – people who present with 
an HIV infection that is already advanced so that the 
opportunity for timely access to treatment and care is 
missed. It reveals that HIV testing should be offered to 
those at risk to ensure early diagnosis and thus better 
prospects for reduced illness and prolonged life. 
On  the  occasion  of  World  AIDS  Day  2010,  ECDC  also 
presented  a  synthesis  of  evidence  on  HIV  testing, 
based on a literature review, and a report pointing out 
the need to scale up HIV testing in the EU, including 3 www.eurosurveillance.org
the screening of pregnant women to reduce mother-to-
child transmission [9,10]. These reports show that HIV 
testing is an important tool to prevent further trans-
mission and to enable early diagnosis for timely refer-
ral to treatment and care. Furthermore, the guidance 
describes core principles that should be considered in 
national testing strategies and steps to be taken when 
setting them up. The reports were launched during a 
scientific  seminar  at  the  European  Parliament  that 
was attended by many stakeholders who engaged in 
a lively debate demonstrating interest and support for 
our work. ‘Know, treat, prevent’ has been ECDC’s motto 
for this year’s World AIDS Day. To continue the efforts 
to reverse the trend of increasing numbers of HIV infec-
tions  in  Europe  and  elsewhere,  concerted  action  is 
needed. In this respect it is vitally important to bring 
HIV testing closer to those at high risk, while simulta-
neously avoiding stigmatisation of and discrimination 
against people living with HIV/AIDS.
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In 2009, 28 European Union and European Economic 
Area (EU/EEA) countries reported 25,917 newly diag-
nosed cases of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). 
Sex among men who have sex with men was the most 
common  transmission  mode  (35%)  followed  by  het-
erosexual  contact  (24%).  Overall,  the  number  of  HIV 
cases in 2009 increased while the number of reported 
acquired  immunodeficiency  syndrome  (AIDS)  diag-
noses continued to decline. It is of concern that a high 
proportion of the patients with known CD4 cells count 
at the time of HIV diagnosis had a CD4 cell count below 
350cells/µl suggesting no timely access to treatment 
and care.
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 
cases in the European Union and European 
Economic Area (EU/EEA), 2009
In  the  EU/EEA,  25,917  people  were  newly  diagnosed 
with HIV in 2009, reported by 28 countries, a rate of 5.7 
per 100,000 population. Data was not reported from 
Austria or Liechtenstein. The overall rate for men was 
8.3 per 100,000 male population and 3.2 for women. 
The highest rates of new HIV diagnoses were reported 
by  Estonia  (30.7),  Latvia  (12.2),  the  United  Kingdom 
(UK) (10.7) and Belgium (10.3). The lowest rates (<1.0) 
were  reported  by  Romania  and  Slovakia.  Twelve  per 
cent  of  new  HIV  diagnoses  were  reported  in  15–24 
year-old individuals and 28% were female. Sex among 
men who have sex with men (MSM) is the predominant 
reported mode of transmission in EU/EEA, accounting 
for 35% of the HIV diagnoses, followed by heterosexual 
contact (24%) when cases from countries with general-
ised HIV epidemics are excluded. Five per cent of HIV 
cases  were  reported  among  intravenous  drug  users 
(IDU). Transmission mode was unknown for 20.3% of 
the cases. The highest proportion of cases classified 
as  heterosexually  transmitted  and  originating  from 
countries  with  generalised  epidemics,  was  observed 
Figure 1
Number of diagnosed and reported HIV infections, EU/EEA, 1984-2009
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in  Norway  (70%),  Sweden  (69%),  Ireland  (62%)  and 
Belgium (60%).
Trends in HIV cases in the EU/EEA 
Among the 28 EU/EEA countries that have consistently 
reported  HIV  data  since  2004,  the  rate  of  HIV  diag-
noses per 100,000 population has been relatively sta-
ble, ranging from 6.5 in 2004 to 5.7 in 2009. In recent 
years, more than 25,000 HIV diagnoses were reported 
each  year,  resulting  in  a  cumulative  total  number  of 
nearly  350,000  diagnoses  reported  since  the  begin-
ning of the epidemic (Figure 1). Since 2004, the propor-
tion  of  newly  HIV  diagnosed  women  decreased  from 
36%  to  28%  in  2009.  HIV  diagnoses  have  tripled  in 
Bulgaria, Iceland and Slovakia and doubled in Hungary 
and Slovenia. HIV diagnoses have decreased by more 
than 20% in Denmark, Estonia, Italy, Luxembourg and 
Romania. 
Since  2004,  26  EU/EEA  countries  have  consistently 
reported  data  on  transmission  mode  (Estonia  and 
Poland were excluded due to inconsistent reporting). 
The  number  of  new  HIV  diagnoses  reported  as  het-
erosexually  acquired  decreased  by  24%  from  13,148 
cases to 9,975 cases. The proportion of heterosexually 
acquired HIV diagnoses from countries with a gener-
alised epidemic, varied from 52% in 2004 to 38% in 
2009. In the same period, the number of cases among 
MSM increased by 24% in, from 7,263 cases to 8,974 
cases  and  declined  among  IDU  by  40%  from  1,952 
cases to 1,171 cases. The number of cases for which 
the transmission category was unknown increased by 
40% (Figure 2). There are reporting delays for a number 
of countries which overall limits the ability to interpret 
the trends in recent years. 
In  2009,  a  total  of  4,650  cases  of  AIDS  diagnoses 
were  reported  in  27  EU/EEA  countries  (no  data  from 
Austria,  Liechtenstein,  Sweden),  representing  a  rate 
of 1.0 cases per 100,000 population. The highest rates 
were reported by Latvia (4.3), Estonia (2.8), Portugal 
(2.8),  and  Spain  (2.3).  In  the  EU/EEA,  a  decline  was 
observed from 9,012 in 2004 to 4,650 in 2009 in all but 
four countries of the 27 countries reporting AIDS diag-
noses consistently. An increase in AIDS diagnoses was 
reported only in Bulgaria from 22 cases to 30 cases 
(36%), Estonia 29 cases to 38 cases (31%), Latvia 89 
cases to 96 cases (8%) and Lithuania 21 cases to 37 
cases (76%). 
Proportion of late presenters
Late  presenters  are  defined  as  patients  with  a  CD4 
cell count below 350 cells/µl at time of HIV diagnosis 
[1]. Data on CD4 cell counts at the time of diagnosis 
were available for cases in 18 countries, ranging from 
1.2% in Bulgaria to 87% in Spain. For 11 countries, CD4 
count information was available for more than 50% of 
the cases (Table). Half of these were reported as late 
presenters, also taking into account possible reporting 
bias for more advanced HIV diagnoses. A slightly higher 
proportion of female cases (54.4%) were reported as 
late  presenters  compared  with  male  cases  (49.6%), 
with high heterogeneity among females across coun-
tries ranging from 33% in Cyprus and Luxembourg to 
68% in Denmark. Among males, the proportion of late 
presenters ranged from 20% in Luxembourg to 60% in 
Denmark. 
Among  new  diagnoses  acquired  heterosexually  the 
proportion  of  late  presenters  ranged  from  20%  in 
Luxembourg to 67% in Slovakia, while seven countries 
reported more than 50% of the newly diagnosed cases 
as  late  presenters  (Table).  For  MSM,  the  proportion 
of late presenters varied from 25% in Luxembourg to 
50% in Slovenia (Table). Among IDU, the proportion of 
late presenters ranged from 49% in the UK to 60% in 
Denmark. All countries but Spain and the UK reported 
more than half of their cases with unknown risk factor 
as late presenters.
 
Figure 3 shows that among 10 222 cases with CD4 cell 
count reported, 51% were “late presenters”. The larg-
est proportion of late presenters is among individuals 
originating  from  sub-Saharan  Africa  and  southeast/
Figure 2
HIV infection by transmission group and origin in EU/
EEA countriesa 2004-2009
EEA: European Economic Area; EU: European Union.
a Data from Austria, Estonia and Poland not included
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eastern  Asia,  followed  by  cases  from  the  Caribbean 
and Latin America. The proportion of late presenters is 
slightly higher in eastern Europe compared with central 
and western Europe. The areas are defined in the most 
recent ECDC/WHO HIV/AIDS surveillance report [4]. 
Conclusions
As in previous years, the highest proportion of the total 
number of new HIV diagnoses in 2009 in EU/EEA coun-
tries was reported among MSM, followed by heterosex-
uals. For the known transmission modes, a substantial 
increase was reported only in MSM. Heterosexual HIV 
transmission  continues  to  be  frequently  reported; 
the  proportion  of  cases  classified  as  heterosexually 
acquired  in  persons  originating  from  countries  with 
generalised epidemics is decreasing, although it is still 
high in several countries. Although there is an appar-
ent decline in the number of HIV diagnoses among IDU, 
injecting drug use is still the predominant transmission 
mode in several Eastern European countries. The trans-
mission mode for a significant proportion of cases was 
reported as unknown, highlighting the importance of 
the improvement of surveillance data to better target 
public health interventions. The number of AIDS cases 
is decreasing in most of the countries except Bulgaria 
and Baltic States. 
It is important to obtain more rigorous HIV surveillance 
data to better reflect changing epidemiological condi-
tions. Inclusion of CD4 cell count at diagnosis provides 
an opportunity to interpret the data in greater depth. 
However, the reporting of CD4 cell counts needs to be 
improved as it was reported only for 40% of all new 
HIV diagnoses in 2009. Half of those were diagnosed 
as late presenters’, and it appears that late present-
ers are more often from outside of Europe. Timely HIV 
diagnosis is beneficial for the patient as it decreases 
morbidity and mortality and reduce HIV transmission 
[2-3]. Many factors influence the interpretation of the 
data such as the stage of the epidemic in the region, 
migration  patterns  and  reporting  bias.  However  the 
data  suggest  that  access  to  testing  and  treatment 
needs to be improved among those at risk. Recently, 
ECDC has launched guidance in HIV testing to support 
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Figure 3
All cases with CD4 cell count reported, proportion of late 
presenters by region of origin (n=10,222)
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Member States in the increasing the uptake of HIV test-
ing in Europe [4-7] 
Surveillance  of  HIV  and  AIDS  in  Europe  provides  the 
large  scale  picture  of  the  HIV  epidemics  within  its 
regions and of its main characteristics and risk groups 
affected, which is necessary to monitor the epidemic 
and  guide  the  public  health  response  to  control  HIV 
transmission  of  infections.  Ensuring  high  quality  of 
the  data  is  of  utmost  importance  to  follow  up  and 
achieve  the  objectives  set  up  in  the  EU  Commission 
communication  and  action  plan  ’Combating  HIV/AIDS 
in  the  European  Union  and  Neighbouring  countries, 
2009-2013’.
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We  report  the  preliminary  findings  of  the  investiga-
tion of an outbreak of foodborne Salmonella Bareilly. 
Between August and November 2010, there were 231 
laboratory-confirmed  reports  of  S.  Bareilly  in  the 
United  Kingdom.  A  case–control  study  showed  that 
consumption of bean sprouts was significantly asso-
ciated with illness. The investigation concluded that 
raising public awareness to ensure the correct prep-
aration of raw bean sprouts during cooking was the 
principal means of preventing further cases.
Background
Consumption  of  bean  sprouts  has  previously  been 
associated  with  outbreaks  of  Salmonella  infection 
[1,2]. There was previously an outbreak of S. Saint-Paul 
infection associated with bean sprouts in the United 
Kingdom (UK) in 1988 [3]. 
Salmonella enterica subsp. enterica serovar Bareilly, or 
S. Bareilly, is a group C1 serovar first identified in India 
in 1928 [4]. In years when no outbreaks occur, on aver-
age 30 to 50 cases are reported in England and two to 
five cases in Scotland. 
The  current  investigation  began  on  27  August  2010, 
when an outbreak of S. Bareilly was reported following 
a  wedding  reception  in  Greater  Manchester  in  north-
west England. An increase in the number of detected 
cases of S. Bareilly was also reported in Scotland on 
2 September 2010 and more widely in England on 10 
September 2010. The outbreak was first reported to the 
European  Centre  for  Disease  Prevention  and  Control 
(ECDC) Epidemic Intelligence Information System (EPIS) 
site on 14 September, providing an image of the out-
break pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) profile. 
Between 14 September and 1 October, 10 EPIS mem-
bers  responded  with  no  indication  of  co-temporal 
increases  in  findings  of  this  serovar.  One  country 
(Ireland) reported the same profile in a case who had 
visited London in September, but no further exposure 
data was available.
Preliminary information from cases in Scotland, from 
the wedding outbreak investigation, and from trawling 
questionnaires  including  questions  on  a  comprehen-
sive range of possible risk factors including foodstuffs, 
raised  the  hypothesis  of  salad  leaves  and/or  bean 
sprouts  as  possible  vehicles  of  infection.  A  matched 
case–control  study  including  34  cases  meeting  the 
case  definition  was  conducted  across  the  UK  begin-
ning on 21 September 2010. At the time the case–con-
trol study started there were some 40 cases who had 
not done the trawling questionnaire and who were not 
linked to the wedding outbreak.
Between the beginning of August and the 19 November 
2010, there were 231 laboratory-confirmed reports of 
S. Bareilly across the UK. 10 of these were linked to the 
wedding in Greater Manchester.
Case–control study 
Definition of cases and controls
The  case–control  study  was  conducted  using  tele-
phone interviews with cases of S. Bareilly fitting the 
confirmed  case  definition  and  with  controls  selected 
by  sequential  digit  dialling  based  on  the  telephone 
number of the case, to match on broad geographical 
location of residence. 
Confirmed cases were defined as persons aged 18 and 
over  with  microbiologically  confirmed  infection  with 
S.  Bareilly  with  a  sample  received  at  the  Health 
Protection Agency (HPA) Salmonella Reference Unit or 
the Scottish Salmonella, Shigella and Clostridium dif-
ficile Reference Laboratory on or after 1 August 2010 
with (i) no history of foreign travel or close contact with 
a case of diarrhoea in the seven days prior to the onset 
of illness, (ii) who did not attend the wedding in the 9 www.eurosurveillance.org
northwest of England associated with the point source 
outbreak and (iii) who had not been previously inter-
viewed as part of the preliminary investigation.
Controls were defined as residents of England, Wales, 
Northern Ireland or Scotland aged 18 and over residing 
in the area covered by the same telephone exchange 
as  their  matched  cases  who  had  not  had  gastroin-
testinal symptoms (vomiting and/or diarrhoea) in the 
seven days prior to interview, and who had no history 
of foreign travel or of close contact with a case of diar-
rhoea in the seven days prior to interview. The person 
answering  the  telephone  was  recruited  unless  they 
were a child, in which case interviewers asked to speak 
to an adult. The case–control ratio was 1:2.
Interviews
Data were collected on demographics, clinical features 
and outcomes, travel history, infectious contacts, and 
consumption of salad leaves, bean sprouts or alfalfa 
sprouts in the three days prior to illness (or three days 
prior  to  interview  for  controls).  Information  on  travel 
history and infectious contacts was collected to check 
eligibility.    After  descriptive  and  univariate  analysis, 
forward  stepwise  conditional  logistic  regression  was 
conducted using the statistical software R [5]. Possible 
risk factors with a p value of <0.2 in univariate anal-
ysis  were  added  sequentially  after  assessment  for 
multicollinearity.
Laboratory investigation of food items
Samples of bean sprouts (100 g) were collected from 
suppliers  B  and  C.  They  were  examined  using  HPA 
standard methods, based on BS EN ISO 6579:2002, for 
the detection of Salmonella spp, modified to include 
extended incubation for 48 hours for both enrichment 
media  (Muller-Kauffmann  tetrathionate  novobiocin 
broth and Rappaport-Vassiliadis Soya Peptone broth) 
and selective solid media Xylose Lysine Desoxycholate 
and Brilliant Green agars [6].
Results of case–control study
Data  on  34  cases  (response  rate  of  77%)  meeting 
the case definition, with onset dates ranging from 13 
September 2010 to 14 October 2010, and 64 eligible 
controls were collected. Cases had a mean age of 49 
years (standard deviation 15.1 years) and 21 of 33 cases 
were  female.  A  total  of  32  of  34  reported  diarrhoea 
and  seven  of  34  reported  vomiting.  Five  cases  had 
been hospitalised as a result of their infection. Cases 
reported a median duration of illness of 7.5 days (range 
2 to 30 days). 
In  univariate  analysis,  consumption  of  bean  sprouts, 
consumption of any salad leaves and age younger than 
65 years were all significantly associated with illness. 
In the final conditional logistic regression model, only 
consumption of bean sprouts was significantly asso-
ciated  with  illness  (crude  matched  odds  ratio  (OR) 
8.3, 95% confidence interval (CI)1.8 to 38.7; adjusted 
matched OR 6.8, 95% CI 1.4 to 33.0). Of the 15 cases 
who  recalled  consumption  of  bean  sprouts,  six  had 
eaten them in the home (four had purchased them from 
supermarkets). 10 had eaten them in take away meals 
or  at  restaurants.  (One  person  had  eaten  them  from 
both sources.) 
In total, 94 of the 231 patient isolates underwent fur-
ther typing and 87 of these were found to be of PFGE 
type SBARXB.0016. 
Food investigation
The complex distribution network of bean sprouts and 
the results of routine microbiological testing of bean 
sprouts by suppliers for quality control purposes in the 
UK were also investigated. In August and September 
2010, two UK suppliers identified in the investigation 
of the Scottish cases (suppliers A and B) had recorded 
the identification of a group C Salmonella in samples 
of bean sprouts which were intended to be cooked by 
consumers. None of these isolates were available for 
further  characterisation.  Routine  regular  testing  of 
samples at an upstream supplier (supplier C, who sup-
plies B, who in turn supplies A) had been consistently 
negative for many years.
Samples of bean sprouts from suppliers B and C were 
collected. S. Bareilly of a PFGE type indistinguishable 
from  the  outbreak  cases  was  identified  in  a  packet 
of  bean  sprouts  produced  by  supplier  C.  Supplier  C 
received  mung  bean  seeds  from  upstream  suppliers 
who sourced mung bean seeds from China or Myanmar. 
The investigation is ongoing.
Discussion
Our epidemiological and microbiological investigations 
implicated  bean  sprouts  as  a  vehicle  for  S.  Bareilly 
transmission, consistent with previous research show-
ing that bean sprouts can be a vehicle for Salmonella 
transmission [1].
Case–control study designs are prone to a number of 
biases, the most important being recall bias. Although 
Figure
Epidemic curve of S. Bareilly cases in England, Wales and 
Northern Irelanda, 2010 (n=213)
a By specimen date.
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there was a small amount of press interest in the pos-
sible link between S. Bareilly and bean sprouts at the 
time of the case–control study it is unlikely that many 
people  in  the  general  public  were  aware  of  a  possi-
ble link between Salmonella and bean sprouts. In our 
study, controls were selected by random digit dialling, 
which may result in a low response rate and controls 
that are not representative of the general population. 
This  is  however  unlikely  to  account  for  the  strong 
observed association in our study. 
Bean sprouts follow a complex path from farm to table 
that  includes  growing,  harvesting,  processing  and 
shipping of mung bean seeds, followed by sprouting 
(normally at temperatures of 20-30 oC with high humid-
ity)  and  distribution  of  the  finished  product.  Seeds 
may arrive already contaminated or contamination may 
occur at any point of production and distribution. As in 
previous outbreaks, this investigation concluded that 
the seeds were likely to have been contaminated , as 
investigations  at  suppliers  found  little  potential  for 
cross contamination of sprouted seeds [7]. Based on 
the experience of this investigation, the methodology 
used for routine microbiological quality control testing 
of bean sprouts may not be sensitive to low levels of 
Salmonella contamination. This may have implications 
for future testing protocols.
The  bean  sprouts  implicated  in  this  investigation 
were not ready to eat products and would be safe to 
eat  if  the  instructions  for  correct  preparation  (wash-
ing and cooking until piping hot) were followed. Public 
health  interventions  resulting  from  this  investigation 
focussed on communications to the public and to pub-
lic  and  environmental  health  professionals  advising 
of  the  correct  preparation  of  bean  sprouts,  and  on 
improving  food  labelling  where  this  was  ambiguous. 
Given that S. Bareilly was only detected in raw mung 
bean sprouts intended to be cooked, rather than ready 
to eat bean sprouts, and the producers and suppliers 
have not been found to be at fault in our investigations, 
no product recalls were deemed necessary. No other 
interventions  besides  addressing  the  issue  of  poten-
tially misleading labels were put in place with suppli-
ers and producers. At the time of writing, the numbers 
of reports of S. Bareilly infection in the UK had fallen 
back to near expected levels.
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An outbreak of Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase 
(KPC)-producing  Klebsiella  pneumoniae  type  2  was 
detected in September 2009 in two hospitals in a sub-
urb south of Paris, France. In total, 13 KPC-producing 
K. pneumoniae type 2 cases (four with infections and 
nine  with  digestive-tract  colonisations)  were  identi-
fied, including a source case transferred from a Greek 
hospital. Of the 13 cases, seven were secondary cases 
associated with use of a contaminated duodenoscope 
used to examine the source case (attack rate: 41%) and 
five were secondary cases associated with patient-to-
patient  transmission  in  hospital.  All  isolated  strains 
from  the  13  patients:  (i)  exhibited  resistance  to  all 
antibiotics  except  gentamicin  and  colistin,  (ii)  were 
more resistant to ertapenem (minimum inhibitory con-
centration (MIC) always greater than 4 mg/L) than to 
imipenem (MIC: 1–8 mg/L, depending on the isolate), 
(iii) carried the blaKPC-2 and blaSHV12 genes and (iv) had 
an indistinguishable pulsed-field gel electrophoresis 
(PFGE) pattern. These cases occurred in three hospi-
tals:  some  were  transferred  to  four  other  hospitals. 
Extended infection control measures implemented in 
the  seven  hospitals  included:  (i)  limiting  transfer  of 
cases and contact patients to other wards, (ii) cohort-
ing  separately  cases  and  contact  patients,  (iii)  rein-
forcing hand hygiene and contact precautions and (iv) 
systematic screening of contact patients. Overall, 341 
contact patients were screened. A year after the out-
break, no additional case has been identified in these 
seven hospitals. This outbreak emphasises the impor-
tance of rapid identification and notification of emerg-
ing highly resistant K. pneumoniae strains in order to 
implement reinforced control measures.
Introduction
  The  emergence  of  Klebsiella  pneumoniae  carbap-
enemase (KPC)-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae type 
2 (hereafter referred to as KPC-2 K. pneumoniae) has 
been  reported  worldwide  and  is  becoming  a  major 
clinical and public health concern [1]. Such pathogens 
remain rare in France although a few outbreaks have 
been reported [2]. In this paper we describe a multi-hos-
pital outbreak of KPC-2 K. pneumoniae, which occurred 
in a suburb south of Paris, France, in September and 
October 2009.
Alert of a healthcare-associated infection
A  national  healthcare-associated  infection  early 
warning  and  response  system  was  set  up  in  France 
in  2001,  coordinated  at  national  level  by  the  French 
public  health  surveillance  institute  (Institut  de  Veille 
Sanitaire, InVS) [3]. Through this system, two univer-
sity hospitals (Hospitals A and B) in a suburb of south 
of Paris each reported KPC-2 K. pneumoniae bacterae-
mia in one patient at the end of September 2009 to the 
Regional Coordinating Centre for Nosocomial Infection 
Control (Centre de coordination de la lutte contre les 
infections nosocomiales (CCLIN Paris-Nord)) in north-
ern France and to the regional health authorities. The 
case  in  Hospital  A  was  notified  the  day  before  the 
notification  of  the  case  in  Hospital  B.  These  hospi-
tals belonged to the same institution, the Assistance 
Publique–Hôpitaux de Paris.
Epidemiological investigations
In response to the notifications from the two hospitals, 
local  infection  control  teams  carried  out  epidemio-
logical investigations with the support of the regional 12 www.eurosurveillance.org
Figure
Spatio-temporal description: multi-hospital outbreak of KPC-2 Klebsiella pneumoniaea, France, September to October 2009 
(n=13)
a Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase (KPC)-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae type 2.
1 A/D + Retrospective KPC-2 K. pneumoniae
identiﬁcation
3 A D +
4 A +
5 Admission May 2009 +
2 A D +
6 A +
7 A +
8 D A +
9 A/D +
11 A/D +
13 D +
10 A/D +
12 A +
Date
2009
Period of medical follow-up until positive specimen
15 Oct 15 Aug
A
B
C
Hospital
1 Nov 1 Aug 1 Sep 15 Sep 1 Oct
Case 6 transferred to Hospital A
Case 10 rehospitalised in Hospital C
 Case number
A   Date of admission 
D   Date of duodenoscopy
+   Date specimen tested positive for KPC-2 K. pneumoniae
Positive
duodenoscope
controls
- Notiﬁcation of index cases (Cases 2 and 3)
- Active screening of contact patients in Hospitals A and B
- Active screening of patients who had had duodenoscopy
  in Hospital B after the source case had (Case 1)
- Strict control measures
Table
Case descriptiona: multi-hospital outbreak of KPC-2 Klebsiella pneumoniaeb, France, September to October 2009 (n=13)
Case 
number  
Hospitalc Duodenoscopy in 
Hospital B
Type of specimen 
tested
Infection/ 
colonisation
Outcome as of 
1 November 2010 
Comment
1 A Yes Rectal swab Colonisation Alive
Source case
(transferred from Greece)
2 B Yes Blood sample
Infection
(bacteraemia)
Death unrelated to 
KPC-2 K. pneumoniae
Index case Hospital B
3 A Yes Blood sample
Infection
(bacteraemia)
Death unrelated to 
KPC-2 K. pneumoniae
Index case Hospital A
4 A No Biliary fluid
Infection 
(biliary)
Alive Contact of Case 3
5 A No Bronchial aspirate
Infection 
(pulmonary)
Death unrelated to 
KPC-2 K. pneumoniae
Contact of Case 3
6 B No Rectal swab Colonisation Alive
Contact of Case 2
Transferred to Hospital A
7 B No Rectal swab Colonisation Alive Contact of Case 2
8 B Yes Rectal swab Colonisation Alive –
9 B Yes Rectal swab Colonisation Alive
Transferred to Hospital D then to 
Hospital E
10 B Yes Rectal swab Colonisation
Alive: urinary tract 
colonisation in 2010
Index case Hospital C
Returned home from Hospital B, 
then  re-hospitalised in Hospital C
11 B Yes Rectal swab Colonisation
Death unrelated to 
KPC-2 K. pneumoniae
Underwent follow-up in Hospitals 
F and G 
12 C No Rectal swab Colonisation Alive Contact of Case 10
13 B Yes Rectal swab Colonisation Alive Underwent follow-up in Hospital G 
a Reasons for hospitalisation included biliary or gall bladder lithiasis, gastrointestinal carcinoma, gastrointestinal haemorrhage, hepatic 
transplantation and peritonitis.
b Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase (KPC)-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae type 2. 
c Hospital where KPC-2 K. pneumoniae was diagnosed.13 www.eurosurveillance.org
infection control coordination centre and of the central 
infection  control  team  of  the  Assistance  Publique–
Hôpitaux de Paris. 
A case was defined as a person from whom KPC-2 K. 
pneumoniae  was  identified  microbiologically  in  rec-
tal swabs taken as part of systematic screening or in 
clinical specimens. A contact patient was defined as a 
person who shared the same unit and the same health-
care workers as a case. All contact patients in hospi-
tal wards were listed and screening was proposed to 
them. 
Outbreak description 
Source case
Preliminary results of the epidemiological investigation 
at the end of September 2009 indicated that the first 
two cases notified from Hospitals A and B had under-
gone duodenoscopy in Hospital B at the end of August 
and in early September 2009 with the same duodeno-
scope. Following notification of these two cases, retro-
spective analysis of the charts of all patients who had 
undergone duodenoscopy since March 2009 (the date 
of the last maintenance by the manufacturer) in Hospital 
B with the same duodenoscope used for the two cases 
pointed to a likely source case – a patient examined 
by duodenoscopy at the end of July 2009 in Hospital B. 
The endoscopy was carried out in Hospital B, but the 
patient  stayed  in  Hospital  A,  after  being  transferred 
from a hospital in Greece, where KPC-2 K. pneumoniae 
is  endemic  [4].  Screening  for  all  Enterobacteriaceae 
resistant to third-generation cephalosporins,in a rectal 
swab on admission – routinely performed in Hospital 
A since a previous outbreak [2] – was negative for this 
likely source case, but a subsequent swab was positive 
(at the start of August 2009). The bacterial strain had 
first been considered as susceptible to carbapenems 
(with  an  imipenem  minimum  inhibitory  concentration 
(MIC) of 1.5 mg/L), but during the outbreak investiga-
tion in September 2009, the laboratory of Hospital A 
detected the blaKPC-2 gene in this isolate. It was there-
fore  retrospectively  considered  as  the  first  isolate 
of  KPC-2  K.  pneumoniae  in  Hospital  A,  and  the  case 
from whom it was isolated as the source case of the 
outbreak.
Secondary cases
There were two further cases of KPC-2 K. pneumoniae 
infection (biliary and pulmonary) in Hospital A at the 
end of September 2009 (Cases 4 and 5); the infection 
was acquired by patient-to-patient transmission in the 
same ward. These patients had not undergone endos-
copy but their stay overlapped with the stay in Hospital 
A of the first case notified by this hospital (Case 3) [5] 
(Figure). 
Active screening of contact patients was then conducted 
in Hospitals A and B: all isolated extended-spectrum 
beta-lactamase  (ESBL)-producing  Enterobacteriaceae 
were screened for susceptibility to carbapenems (imi-
penem and ertapenem) and the MICs were determined. 
No  other  cases  were  identified  among  87  contact 
patients  in  Hospital  A,  but  two  new  cases  (Cases  6 
and 7) were identified among 208 contact patients in 
Hospital B. A total of 295 of 342 contact patients (86%) 
were screened in these two hospitals.
Of  the  17  patients  who  had  undergone  endoscopy  in 
Hospital  B  since  March  2009  with  the  same  duode-
noscope  as  that  used  for  the  source  case,  two  were 
the  notified  index  cases  with  bacteraemia,  five  had 
KPC-2 K. pneumoniae-positive rectal swabs, nine were 
negative after three screenings over the course of the 
two-week investigation and one died before the inves-
tigation  started.  The  carrier  status  of  one  of  these 
five KPC-2 K. pneumoniae-positive patients (Case 10) 
was determined at the start of October 2009, but the 
patient was discharged the same day, to go home. The 
patient was subsequently readmitted (in early October) 
to an intensive care unit in a third hospital (Hospital 
C), without information about their KPC-2 K. pneumo-
niae status. After the infection control practitioner of 
Hospital B had been informed by physicians about the 
patient’s readmission to Hospital C, they informed their 
counterpart in Hospital C, so that screening and control 
measures could be implemented. As a result of screen-
ing of 25 contact patients in Hospital C, one secondary 
case was identified (Case 12). 
Four cases were transferred to or had medical follow-
up in four other hospitals (Hospitals D to G): one was in 
the same region as Hospitals A and B and three were in 
neighbouring regions. The cases’ KPC-2 K. pneumoniae 
status was known at the time of transfer or follow-up. 
In Hospitals D and E, there were no contact patients; in 
Hospital F, three contact patients were screened and in 
Hospital G, 18 were screened (at least one rectal swab 
from each contact patient was obtained and screened). 
No further cases were identified in Hospitals D to G.
By the end of October 2009, 13 KPC-2 K. pneumoniae 
cases  (four  with  infections  and  nine  with  digestive-
tract  colonisations)  had  been  identified  in  Hospitals 
A to C (Table), comprising one source case, seven sec-
ondary  cases  among  the  17  patients  who  underwent 
endoscopy with the same duodenoscope (attack rate: 
41%) and five secondary cases among the 341 contact 
patients in Hospitals A to G (attack rate: 1.5%). There 
were no deaths related to KPC-2 K. pneumoniae infec-
tion.  As  of  1  November  2010,  no  new  case  involving 
the  same  strain  has  been  identified  in  these  seven 
hospitals.
Microbiological investigations
Carbapenem resistance of the isolated bacterial strains 
was initially detected by routine methods [6]. The MIC 
of imipenem and ertapenem was determined by Etest 
(Bio-Rad). The presence of the blaKPC-2 gene and blaSHV12 
gene  was  identified  by  polymerase  chain  reaction 
(PCR) and DNA sequencing.14 www.eurosurveillance.org
In Hospital A, all ESBL-producing K. pneumoniae strains 
that  had  been  isolated  in  the  six  months  before  the 
outbreak were re-investigated, to screen for carbapen-
emase production using the modified Hodge test and 
ethylenediaminetetraacetic  acid  (EDTA)-disc  synergy 
[7] and PCR. 
Rectal  swabs  or  clinical  specimens  were  screened 
for  Enterobacteriaceae  resistant  to  third-generation 
cephalosporins  by  plating  on  Drigalski  agar  contain-
ing  0.5  mg/L  cefotaxime  and  MacConkey  agar  con-
taining  2  mg/L  ceftazidime  (AES  Laboratoire)  [5],  a 
medium commonly used in France for ESBL-producing 
strains.  Indeed  strains  resistant  to  carbapenems  are 
also  resistant  to  third-generation  cephalosporins.  All 
bacteria that grew were identified at the species level 
and tested for susceptibility to various drugs, including 
carbapenems. The laboratory of Hospital B performed 
pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) of genomic DNA 
of the isolated bacteria using Xba 1 restriction enzyme.
Duodenoscope  disinfection  controls  were  performed 
according  to  the  national  recommendations  of  the 
French Ministry of Health published in 2007 [8]. After 
disinfection, 100 ml of sterile wash solution were asep-
tically injected in all channels of the endoscope. The 
wash solution was collected at the other end of the duo-
denoscope and cultured on standard culture medium 
at various temperatures. If the cultures were positive, 
each  channel  was  tested  individually.  Bacterial  colo-
nies were counted and identified according to standard 
methods [6].
At  the  end  of  September  2009,  despite  disinfection 
of  the  endoscope,  two  microbiological  controls  of 
the duodenoscope used by the source and some sub-
sequent  cases  revealed  the  presence  of  faecal  flora 
(Enterobacteriaceae and Enterococcus), including KPC-2 
K. pneumoniae strains (103 colony-forming units (CFU)/
ml) with an indistinguishable PFGE pattern. No other 
multidrug-resistant bacteria were found.
As  already  described  in  reports  focusing  on  micro-
biological aspects of this outbreak [5,9],the KPC-2 K. 
pneumoniae strains isolated from all 13 cases and from 
the duodenoscope showed resistance or intermediate 
susceptibility to all antibiotics except gentamicin and 
colistin. The MIC for imipenem varied between 1.5 mg/L 
and  8  mg/L,  depending  on  the  isolate.  However,  the 
MIC  for  ertapenem  was  always  greater  than  4  mg/L. 
PCR  analysis  of  the  outbreak  strain  identified  the 
blaKPC-2 and the blaSHV 12 genes encoding respectively 
a  carbapenemase  and  an  ESBL  [5].  Two  other  beta-
lactamase genes were identified: blaTEM-1 and blaOXA-9. 
Multilocus sequence typing, performed as previously 
described  [10],  showed  that  all  strains  belonged  to 
sequence type (ST) 258, [11,12]. The PFGE patterns of 
all the isolates were indistinguishable.
Infection control measures 
Evaluation of duodenoscope disinfection 
practices and maintenance
The duodenoscope in question had been acquired by 
Hospital B in 2003 and was therefore rather old in 2009, 
but had been regularly maintained. A new, automated 
cleaning device had been in use for a year; peracetic 
acid had been used instead of glutaraldehyde for disin-
fection. The cleaning and disinfection processes were 
consistent with guidelines [13] but the drying process 
was not optimal. 
The  duodenoscope  was  sent  to  the  manufacturer 
during  the  outbreak  investigation  for  maintenance, 
cleaning  and  desinfection.  No  signs  of  damage  were 
identified. Disinfection procedures were reviewed and 
disinfection practices were observed by the local infec-
tion control team of Hospital B with the support of the 
regional  infection  control  coordination  centre  and  of 
the  central  infection  control  team  of  the  Assistance 
Publique–Hôpitaux  de  Paris.  The  disinfection  proce-
dures were revised, to include a systematic and com-
plete  drying  step  after  each  disinfection  cycle.  After 
the  outbreak,  microbiological  controls  of  the  duode-
noscope  were  performed  more  frequently  (monthly). 
Since  January  2010,  controls  have  been  carried  out 
every  three  months  (before  the  outbreak,  they  were 
performed every six months). 
Hospital infection control procedures
Extended  infection  control  measures  were  imple-
mented in each of the seven hospitals involved by local 
infection  control  teams  with  the  support  of  hospital 
administrators,  coordinated  by  the  regional  infection 
control  coordination  centre  and,  in  Hospitals  A  and 
B,  also  by  the  central  infection  control  team  of  the 
Assistance Publique–Hôpitaux de Paris. The objective 
of  these  measures  was  to  prevent  future  patient-to-
patient transmission and included: (i) limiting transfer 
of cases and contact patients to other wards until the 
case was discharged from hospital, (ii) cohorting cases 
and  contact  patients  in  separate  units  with  different 
healthcare workers, until discharge [14], (iii) flagging 
the presence of cases by displaying a specific poster 
or logo on the doors of cases’ rooms and in the part 
of the ward where cases were cohorted, (iv) reinforcing 
hand hygiene (more and better use of hydroalcoholic 
solutions) and contact precautions, and (v) systematic 
screening of contact patients.
In Hospitals D and E, strengthened control measures 
were immediately implemented at the time of admis-
sion of cases, to ensure that no patients came into con-
tact with a case.
Discussion 
Carbapenemase-producing  K.  pneumoniae  have 
increasingly been isolated from patients in healthcare 
settings worldwide [1] and are already endemic in some 
countries.  In  Europe,  Greece  has  the  highest  preva-
lence of carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae strains; 15 www.eurosurveillance.org
other countries such as Israel and the east coast of the 
United  States  also  have  a  high  prevalence  [1  15,16]. 
In France, a few KPC K pneumoniae cases have been 
reported, mostly from patients transferred from hospi-
tals in the three countries mentioned [1,17,18].
Hospital A receives numerous patients from hospitals in 
Greece and the Middle East and has already described 
an outbreak of Verona integron-encoded metallo-beta-
lactamase (VIM)-producing K. pneumoniae and its con-
trol [14]. Stringent control measures – such as those 
described during the outbreak described in this report 
– are implemented on the admission of such patients, 
to prevent patient-to-patient transmission. In order to 
assist hospitals in the implementation of such control 
measures,  national  guidelines  on  screening  patients 
transferred from abroad have been recently published 
in France [19].
The  outbreak  described  in  this  report  highlights 
the  risk  of  transmitting  multidrug-resistant  bacteria 
through endoscopy, particularly through invasive pro-
cedures  such  as  duodenoscopy,  and  by  patient-to-
patient transmission in hospital. Our analysis showed 
that  seven  of  the  17  patients  who  underwent  endos-
copy with the same duodenoscope used for the source 
case were contaminated with the outbreak strain over 
a  period  of  two  months.  Together  with  the  indistin-
guishable  PFGE  pattern,  this  strongly  suggests  that 
this duodenoscope represented a persistent source of 
contamination. A review showed that endoscopy-asso-
ciated outbreaks are related to inadequate endoscope 
cleaning, although the risk of exogenous infection from 
endoscopes that have been appropriately reprocessed 
is very low [20]. This review reinforces the need for: 
(i) adequate drying after each reprocessing cycle, (ii) 
reprocessing  endoscopes  after  a  period  of  non-use, 
(iii)  microbiological  surveillance  and  (iv)  coordinated 
handling of post-contamination responses. 
The  outbreak  presented  here  shows  that  is  possible 
to limit cross-transmission of multidrug-resistant bac-
teria by healthcare workers in a multi-hospital setting 
by  implementing  systematic  investigation  (includ-
ing screening of contact patients) and extended con-
trol  measures  (including  cohorting  separately  case 
and contact patients), as recommended by the French 
health authorities for controlling the spread of multid-
rug-resistant bacteria [19,21]. However, several weak-
nesses  of  the  infection  control  organisation  during 
this  outbreak  should  be  pointed  out:  (i)  the  source 
case  was  only  identified  retrospectively,  due  to  the 
difficulty  of  identifying  carbapenemase  production 
in  bacterial  strains  with  a  low  level  of  resistance  to 
some  carbapenems;  (ii)  there  was  a  delay  in  issuing 
an alert warning after the identification of the first two 
index cases in Hospitals A and B, which led to a high 
number of contact patients; (iii) one case from Hospital 
B was transferred to another hospital without informa-
tion about the previous hospital stay of this patient or 
the patient’s KPC-2 K. pneumoniae carrier status. The 
lessons learnt from this outbreak may help to improve 
the efficiency of control in future outbreaks and to pre-
vent further outbreaks.
Reactivity and preparedness of local and regional per-
sonnel  (e.g.  microbiologists,  healthcare  workers  and 
infection control teams) are likely to be crucial in con-
trolling  emerging  multidrug-resistant  pathogens  [22]. 
In addition, clear and comprehensive recommendations 
for microbiological laboratories will facilitate the early 
detection of carbapenemase-producing organisms [1]. 
This  outbreak  also  demonstrates  the  usefulness  of 
a  coordinated  healthcare-associated  infection  early 
warning and response system in rapidly implementing 
a multi-hospital investigation, providing assistance to 
hospitals for screening and infection control measures, 
and controlling the spread of an emerging pathogen.
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To  identify  procedures  employed  by  publicly  funded 
clinical diagnostic laboratories in the United Kingdom 
(UK) for the detection of Cryptosporidium in commu-
nity cases of diarrhoea, a telephone survey was con-
ducted between August 2008 and January 2009 of all 
such  laboratories  that  test  stools  from  community-
based  patients.  All  200  laboratories  responded:  145 
(72.5%) tested all stool samples for Cryptosporidium, 
while 55 (27.5%) applied selection criteria. There were 
country and regional differences in the proportion of 
laboratories  selectively  testing  stools,  which  were 
significantly  correlated  with  Cryptosporidium  report 
rates  to  national  surveillance  (Spearman’s  rank  cor-
relation  coefficient  (rs)=0.61,  degrees  of  freedom 
(df)=11, p=0.03). Understanding of laboratory practice 
is  fundamental  to  interpreting  trends  in  surveillance 
data, estimating disease burden and identifying out-
breaks,  as  well  as  providing  important  background 
information against which changes and effects of new 
public health regulations can be measured.
Introduction
Cryptosporidium  is  a  protozoan  parasite  that  infects 
a broad host range, causes gastrointestinal illness in 
humans and young animals and constitutes a signifi-
cant risk to public health, especially among young chil-
dren and immunocompromised patients with specific 
T-cell  deficiencies  [1].  Transmission  is  by  the  faecal–
oral route. Particular challenges to control arise from 
the ability of the transmissive stage, the oocyst, to sur-
vive conventional water treatment and its resistance to 
chlorine disinfection, resulting in waterborne disease 
in  developed  and  developing  countries.  Laboratory 
testing is necessary for differential diagnosis of gas-
troenteritis and implementation of appropriate control 
measures, and requires submission of a stool sample. 
However,  clinicians  and  public  health  professionals 
should be aware that not all laboratories test all stools 
for Cryptosporidium and that Cryoptosporidium testing 
is not necessarily specified in a test request for ova, 
cysts and parasites.
In  the  early  1990s,  following  a  waterborne  outbreak 
of cryptosporidiosis in Swindon, Wiltshire, and neigh-
bouring  parts  of  Oxfordshire,  England  [2],  an  expert 
group  was  established  by  the  then  Departments  of 
Health and Environment to advise the United Kingdom 
(UK) Government on the significance of the presence 
of Cryptosporidium in water supplies. One of the rec-
ommendations  of  the  ensuing  report  was  that  there 
should  be  a  review  and  standardisation  of  clinical 
laboratory  policies  for  examining  faecal  samples  for 
Cryptosporidium  [3].  Evidence  from  a  two-year  pro-
spective study in 16 laboratories where all stools were 
tested for Cryptosporidium showed that 60% of posi-
tive stools were from children up to 15 years of age and 
that 90% were from people under 45 years of age [4]. 
Thus a joint working group recommended that, where 
possible, all specimens from symptomatic individuals 
should be tested, but where this was not feasible, chil-
dren and adults up to 45 years should be tested [5]. As 
a minimum requirement, all children up to and includ-
ing  15  years  of  age  should  be  tested.  Recommended 
methods  were  microscopic  examination  of  faecal 
smears stained with auramine phenol (AP) or a modi-
fied Ziehl-Neelsen’s (mZN) stain [6]. In the UK, stools 
are  submitted  fresh,  without  formalin,  so  concentra-
tion is not required routinely prior to staining. Where 
concentration is deemed necessary, modified methods 
should be used to minimise oocyst losses and prevent 
interference with the adhesion of oocysts to slides and 
with  staining  [6].  Examination  of  stained  smears  is 
required because the oocysts are too small (4–6 µm) 
for accurate identification by unstained observation of 
wet faecal films [6]. The national standard method of 
the  Health  Protection  Agency  (HPA)  currently  recom-
mends that all samples from symptomatic individuals 
should  be  tested  for  Cryptosporidium  [7]  by  micros-
copy using AP or mZN staining, with confirmation by 
staining a new smear using mZN stain [8]. The use of 
enzyme immunoassays (EIAs) is acknowledged but is 
not specified as a national standard method. Despite 
these recommendations, a variable pattern of testing 
has been identified previously [9–11]. In 2006 we sur-18 www.eurosurveillance.org
veyed 169 laboratories in the UK: 36 (21.3%) applied 
selection criteria (unpublished data).
Cryptosporidium  is  included  in  Directive  2003/99/
EC  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  of  the 
European  Union  [12],  which  directs  monitoring  and 
data  collection  of  zoonoses  and  zoonotic  agents. 
Cryptosporidiosis  is  therefore  a  notifiable  disease 
within  the  European  Union  and  laboratory-con-
firmed case data are collected through the European 
Surveillance System (TESSy). However, the disease is 
statutorily notifiable in only some European countries 
(e.g. Germany, Ireland and Sweden). In 2007, only 10 of 
the 30 countries in TESSy reported any cryptosporidi-
osis cases [13] and it is likely that there are substan-
tial  differences  in  ascertainment  between  countries 
[14]. Ireland reported the highest notification rates in 
2007 (14 per 100,000 population), followed by the UK 
(six per 100,000 population). In the UK national surveil-
lance has been based on voluntary, passive laboratory 
reporting of diagnosed cases (either by paper reports 
or through interconnected computer database modules 
to the health protection agencies). Prior to 2010 crypt-
osporidiosis  was  only  statutorily  notifiable  as  part 
of  food  poisoning  notifications.  However,  under  new 
regulations taking forward the modernisation of health 
protection  law,  the  Health  Protection  (Notification) 
Regulations 2010, Cryptosporidium is included in the 
list of causative agents known as Schedule 2 and so 
detection of the parasite became notifiable by UK labo-
ratories  in  October  2010,  except  in  Scotland,  where 
Cryptosporidium became notifiable on 1 January 2010 
under the Public Health etc. (Scotland) Act 2008.
Baseline  knowledge of  the  policies  and practices  for 
detecting  and  reporting  Cryptosporidium  is  essen-
tial for assessing disease burden, comparing surveil-
lance  data,  identifying  outbreaks,  and  implementing 
and  monitoring  interventions.  To  establish  clinical 
laboratory procedures prior to changes in notification 
requirements, and to identify changes since the previ-
ous surveys, we surveyed between August 2008 and 
January  2009  the  policies  of  publicly  funded  labora-
tories throughout the UK concerning Cryptosporidium 
testing and reporting. 
Methods 
All 200 publicly funded clinical laboratories that test 
stools from community-based patients in the UK were 
contacted by telephone between 20 August 2008 and 
27 January 2009. One person (B. Campbell) interviewed 
the  consultant  microbiologist,  laboratory  manager  or 
lead biomedical scientist using a structured question-
naire. The questions were about selection criteria for 
testing  stools  for  Cryptosporidium,  diagnostic  tests 
and reporting results, and referred to community cases 
of diarrhoea. 
Data were recorded and analysed in Microsoft Excel. 
Regional  and  national  numbers  of  reported  crypt-
osporidiosis cases were obtained from the websites of 
the HPA (for England and Wales) [15], the Communicable 
Disease  Surveillance  Centre  (Northern  Ireland)  [16] 
and Health Protection Scotland [17]. Report rates per 
100,000  population  were  calculated  using  mid-year 
population estimates for 2008 [18] as denominator and 
were compared with the proportion of laboratories test-
ing all stools. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient 
Table
Laboratory testing of community cases of diarrhoea for Cryptosporidium and reports to national surveillance in the United 
Kingdom, 2008
Country or Government office 
region (England only)
Number of laboratories
testing all stools for Cryptosporidium/number of 
laboratories (%)
Number of Cryptosporidium reports to national surveillancea
(rate per 100,000 population)
England  100/154 (65) 3,885 (7.5)
East 12/18 (67) 469 (8.2)
East Midlands 7/8 (88) 547 (12.3)
London 7/23 (30) 197 (2.6)
North East 3/9 (33) 193 (7.5)
North West 24/27 (89) 673 (9.8)
South East 11/22 (50) 467 (5.6)
South West 10/15 (67) 458 (8.8)
West Midlands 14/17 (83) 383 (7.1)
Yorkshire and the 
Humber
12/15 (80) 498 (9.6)
Wales 14/14 (100) 239 (8.0)
Northern Ireland 5/6 (83) 119 (6.7)
Scotland 26/26 (100) 613 (11.9)
Total 145/200 (73) 4,856 (7.9)
a Data sources: Health Protection Agency Centre for Infections (England and Wales) [15]; Public Health Agency Communicable Disease 
Surveillance Centre (Northern Ireland) [16] and Health Protection Scotland [17].19 www.eurosurveillance.org
(rs) was obtained by applying the formula for Pearson’s 
r to the ranks of the two variables.
Results 
Of  the  200  laboratories  surveyed,  all  confirmed  that 
they tested specimens from community cases of diar-
rhoea. Of these, 154 laboratories were in England, 14 
in Wales, 26 in Scotland, and six in Northern Ireland. A 
total of 145 (72.5%) tested all stool samples from com-
munity cases of diarrhoea for Cryptosporidium while 55 
(27.5%) applied selection criteria. There were country 
and regional differences in the proportion of laborato-
ries selectively testing stools: in Scotland and Wales 
all  stools  were  tested,  in  Northern  Ireland  only  one 
laboratory  applied  selection  criteria,  but  in  London, 
England, only seven of 23 laboratories tested all stools 
(Table). 
There  was  a  positive  relationship  between 
Cryptosporidium  reports  to  national  surveillance  and 
completeness  of  laboratory  testing  at  the  regional 
level;  the  two  were  significantly  correlated  (rs=0.61, 
degrees of freedom (df)=11, p=0.03) (Figure). 
Of the 55 laboratories that selectively tested stools for 
Cryptosporidium, one or more of the following criteria 
were applied: age (n=38), immune status (n=36), stool 
consistency (n=37), duration of diarrhoea (n=3), over-
seas travel (n=22), farm visit or animal contact (n=17), 
clinician’s request (n=13) and during an outbreak (n=3). 
The 38 laboratories that selected specimens according 
to age used the following categories: >6 months (n=1), 
6  months  to  60  years  (n=1),  <2  years  (n=1),  <5  years 
(n=3), <6 years (n=1), <8 years (n=1), <9 years (n=1), <10 
years (n=4), <11 years (n=1), <12 years (n=1), <14 years 
(n=2), <15 years (n=6), <16 years (n=9), <45 years (n=5) 
and <50 years (n=1). 
The diagnostic methods used were mainly staining of 
faecal  smears,  either  by  an  mZN  stain  (n=44,  21.9% 
laboratories) or AP stain with a variety of counterstains 
(n=151, 75.5% laboratories). Of the laboratories using 
AP staining, 61 (40.4%) confirmed the finding by mZN 
staining.  One  laboratory  also  used  immunofluores-
cence microscopy to resolve equivocal results. Parasite 
concentration methods were used prior to staining by 
seven  laboratories;  six  used  commercially  available 
faecal  parasite  concentrators  and  one  an  in-house 
diethyl ether method. In the UK, stools are submitted 
fresh and so concentration is not usually required. 
Five laboratories used commercially available EIAs as 
the primary test. Two of these were Cryptosporidium-
only  assays  and  three  were  combination  assays  for 
the  simultaneous  detection  of  Cryptosporidium  and 
Giardia. All five laboratories using EIAs confirmed find-
ings  by  a  second  method;  the  Cryptosporidium-only 
assays  were  confirmed  by  staining  and  microscopy 
and the combination assays with either staining and 
microscopy or commercially available Cryptosporidium-
specific immunochromatographic tests. 
Reporting for surveillance purposes was undertaken by 
190 (95%) laboratories. Reporting to local authorities 
was also undertaken by 190 (95%) laboratories (not the 
same 190). 
Discussion
Current UK guidance on laboratory testing is that stools 
from all community cases of diarrhoea should be tested 
for  Cryptosporidium  [7].  Although  this  was  achieved 
by  almost  three  quarters  of  laboratories  nationally, 
there  were  large  differences  between  the  countries 
and regions and this may have an effect on the assess-
ment of the burden of illness and ability to monitor out-
breaks as well as measure changes in the number of 
reported cryptosporidiosis cases and report rates. It is 
of particular concern that 23 laboratories did not meet 
the minimum requirement of testing all children up to 
and including 15 years of age. Furthermore, where age 
criteria  were  applied  these  varied  enormously  with 
often no apparent rationale for the age cut-offs, lead-
ing to further inconsistencies in the data. The effect of 
age policy on case age distribution has been reported 
previously [11]. The value of testing adults, particularly 
up  to  age  45  years,  has  been  demonstrated  [4]  and 
their inclusion in testing plays a key role in the ability 
to detect outbreaks, particularly those linked to drink-
ing water, which affect all ages. It is well documented 
that one of the features of waterborne outbreaks is an 
excess  of  adult  cases  [19].  The  use  of  inappropriate 
criteria has also been observed, especially submitted 
stool consistency, which is an unreliable predictor of 
Cryptosporidium positivity [20]. We discussed our find-
ings with the regional microbiology network. The data 
demonstrate to clinicians that, even in the UK where 
testing is widespread, if cryptosporidiosis is suspected 
clinically then Cryptosporidium should be specified on 
the request form to ensure appropriate testing. 
Despite  some  inadequacies,  most  stool  samples  are 
tested for Cryptosporidium in most regions of the UK 
Figure
Relationship between regional rate of Cryptosporidium 
reports and completeness of laboratory testing in each 
region, United Kingdom, 2008
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and  this  appears  to  be  a  relatively  stable  situation, 
with some notable exceptions. Overall, there has been 
little change between 2006 and 2008 with respect to 
the proportion of laboratories testing all samples. New 
developments in streamlining of laboratory testing are 
now  available  in  the  form  of  automated  microscope 
slide staining and reliable alternatives to microscopy 
are  provided  by  second-generation  EIAs.  These,  par-
ticularly  when  coupled  with  automated  processing 
and  reading  devices,  simplify  laboratory  testing  and 
assist  in  the  standardisation  of  laboratory  methods. 
Additional  benefits  have  been  demonstrated  from 
the  application  of  combination  assays  –  for  exam-
ple,  improved  ascertainment  of  Giardia,  particularly 
in  groups  not  considered  traditionally  for  testing 
[21].  Since  our  survey  was  completed,  we  are  aware 
of  at  least  two  more  laboratories  that  have  replaced 
microscopy  with  EIA  for  Cryptosporidium  and  Giardia 
detection and more laboratories are using immunochro-
matographic assays. Alternatively, multiplex polymer-
ase chain reaction (PCR) assays for routine diagnosis 
of various combinations of gastrointestinal pathogens 
including Cryptosporidium offer streamlined and mod-
ernised  laboratory  testing,  and  are  routinely  used  in 
the Netherlands [22] and are under investigation in the 
UK. 
Although  an  association  cannot  be  proven  by  such 
analysis,  there  was  a  correlation  between  increased 
annual reporting rates and the proportion of laborato-
ries testing all stools at the regional level. The analysis 
was  imperfect  because,  while  surveillance  data  may 
include  reports  from  inpatients,  only  data  related  to 
testing  community  samples  were  used.  However,  we 
consider this would not lead to much discrepancy, as 
the  vast  majority  of  cases  are  diagnosed  from  com-
munity settings. Furthermore, there are other possible 
reasons for genuine regional or local variation in the 
numbers of reported cryptosporidiosis cases, such as 
exposure,  environmental  and  socio-economic  factors 
[23,24]. Despite this, the trend for correlation between 
regional  reporting  and  testing  rates  is  notable,  as 
shown in the Figure. The higher cryptosporidiosis rates 
reported by the UK to TESSy, compared with most other 
European  countries,  are  undoubtedly  influenced  in 
part by differences in approaches to laboratory testing 
and  data  collection.  Standardised  laboratory  testing 
and reporting of pathogens in the European setting is 
important in minimising discrepancies, ensuring com-
parability of surveillance data and enabling rapid pub-
lic health action in the event of international incidents 
and outbreaks [12].
A high proportion of laboratories already report crypt-
osporidiosis cases to local authorities for further inves-
tigation and to surveillance systems in the UK. Although 
statutory  notification  will  ensure  high  ascertainment 
where all samples are tested for Cryptosporidium, the 
requirements of the new Health Protection (Notification) 
Regulations do not extend to mandatory testing, and 
there will still be an effect on the reported incidence of 
cryptosporidiosis. This has been observed in Ireland, 
where Cryptosporidium became statutorily notifiable in 
2004, but a large number of laboratories have opted to 
apply an age threshold as a selection criterion [25]. The 
interpretation  of  routine  laboratory  surveillance  data 
is difficult without standardised policies, and without 
these,  comparisons  at  regional,  national  and  inter-
national  levels  are  hampered  [14].  Cryptosporidiosis 
remains an underreported disease despite the increase 
in testing in countries such as the UK. Understanding 
of laboratory practice is fundamental to understanding 
trends in surveillance data, estimating disease burden 
and identifying outbreaks.
Acknowledgements
We wish to thank all the laboratory staff who provided the 
information on which this report is based.
References
1.  Hunter PR, Nichols G. Epidemiology and clinical features of 
Cryptosporidium infection in immunocompromised patients. 
Clin Microbiol Rev. 2002;15(1):45-54. 
2.  Richardson AJ, Frankenberg RA, Buck AC, Selkon JB, 
Colbourne JS, Parsons JW, et al. An outbreak of waterborne 
cryptosporidiosis in Swindon and Oxfordshire. Epidemiol 
Infect. 1991;107(3):485-95. 
3.  Group of Experts. Cryptosporidium in water supplies. Report 
of the Group of Experts. Chairman Sir John Badenoch. London: 
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office; 1990. 
4.  Palmer SR, Biffin AH. Public Health Laboratory Service 
Study Group. Cryptosporidiosis in England and Wales: 
prevalence and clinical and epidemiological features. BMJ. 
990;300(6727):774-7. 
5.  Casemore DP, Roberts C. Guidelines for screening for 
Cryptosporidium in stools: report by a joint working group. J 
Clin Pathol. 1993;46(1):2-4. 
6.  Casemore DP. ACP Broadsheet 128: June 1991. Laboratory 
methods for diagnosing cryptosporidiosis. J Clin Pathol. 
1991;44(6):445-51. 
7.  Health Protection Agency (HPA). Investigation of specimens 
other than blood for parasites. National Standard Method 
BSOP 31. Issue 3. London: HPA; 2008. Available from: http://
www.hpa-standardmethods.org.uk/documents/bsop/pdf/
bsop31.pdf 
8.  Health Protection Agency (HPA). Staining procedures. National 
Standard Method BSOP TP 39. Issue 1. London: HPA; 2007. 
Available from: http://www.hpa-standardmethods.org.uk/
documents/bsopTP/pdf/bsoptp39.pdf 
9.  Chalmers RM, Hughes S, Thomas AL, Woodhouse S, Thomas 
PD, Hunter P. Laboratory ascertainment of Cryptosporidium 
and local authority public health policies for the investigation 
of sporadic cases of cryptosporidiosis in two regions of the 
United Kingdom. Commun Dis Public Health. 2002;5(2):114-8. 
10.  Crook P, Mayon-White R, Reacher M. Enhancing surveillance 
of cryptosporidiosis: test all faecal specimens from children. 
Commun Dis Public Health. 2002;5(2):112-3. 
11.  Campbell DM, Flannagan PA. Laboratory examination 
for Cryptosporidium spp. in Scotland. J Clin Pathol. 
1992;45(10):914-6. 
12.  European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. 
Directive 2003/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 17 November 2003 on the monitoring of zoonoses 
and zoonotic agents, amending Council Decision 90/424/EEC 
and repealing Council Directive 92/117/EEC. Official Journal of 
the European Union. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union. 12.12.2003: L 325/31. Available from: http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:32
5:0031:0040:EN:PDF 
13.  European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). 
Annual epidemiological report on communicable diseases in 
Europe 2009. Stockholm: ECDC; 2009 . Available from: http://
www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publications/0910_
SUR_Annual_Epidemiological_Report_on_Communicable_
Diseases_in_Europe.pdf 21 www.eurosurveillance.org
14. Semenza J, Nichols G. Cryptosporidiosis surveillance and 
water-borne outbreaks in Europe. Euro Surveill. 2007;12(5). 
pii: 711. Available from: http://www.eurosurveillance.org/
ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=711 
15.  Health Protection Agency (HPA). All identifications 
of cryptosporidium, 1989-2008. Available from: 
http://www.hpa.org.uk/Topics/InfectiousDiseases/
InfectionsAZ/Cryptosporidium/EpidemiologicalData//
cryptoallcases19892008/ 
16.  Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre Northern Ireland 
(CDSC(NI)). Laboratory reports of Cryptosporidium sp (all 
specimen types). 1995-2009. Belfast: CDSC(NI). Available 
from: http://www.cdscni.org.uk/surveillance/Gastro/
Cryptosporidium_sp.htm 
17.  Health Protection Scotland (HPS). Gastro-intestinal and 
foodborne infections: laboratory reports of viral and 
protozoal infections reported to HPS in 2008. HPS weekly 
report. 11 February 2009. Volume 43, No. 2009/06. p. 67-9. 
Available from: http://www.documents.hps.scot.nhs.uk/ewr/
pdf2009/0906.pdf 
18.  Office for National Statistics (ONS). Population estimates 
for UK, England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland - 
current datasets. ONS: Titchfield, Fareham. [Accesssed 4 Mar 
2010]. Available from: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/
product.asp?vlnk=15106 
19.  Meinhardt P, Casemore DP, Miller KB. Epidemiologic aspects 
of human cryptosporidiosis and the role of waterborne 
transmission. Epidemiologic Rev. 1996;18(2):118-36. 
20. Casemore DP, Armstrong M, Sands RL. Laboratory diagnosis of 
cryptosporidiosis. J Clin Pathol. 1985;38(12):1337-41. 
21.  Ellam H, Verlander NQ, Lamden K, Cheesbrough JS, Durband 
CA, James S. Surveillance of giardiasis in Northwest England 
1996-2006: impact of an enzyme immunoassay test. Euro 
Surveill. 2008;13(37). pii: 18977. Available from: http://www.
eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=18977 
22. Bruijnesteijn van Coppenraet LE, Wallinga JA, Ruijs GJ, 
Bruins MJ, Verweij JJ. Parasitological diagnosis combining an 
internally controlled real-time PCR assay for the detection of 
four protozoa in stool samples with a testing algorithm for 
microscopy. Clin Microbiol Infect. 2009;15(9):869-74. 
23. Hunter PR, Hughes LS, Woodhouse S, Syed Q, Verlander N, 
Chalmers RM, et al. Sporadic cryptosporidiosis case-control 
study with genotyping. Emerg Infect Dis. 2004;10(7):1241-9. 
24. Lake IR, Harrison FCD, Chalmers RM, Bentham G, Nichols G, 
Hunter PR, et al. Case-control study of environmental and 
social factors influencing cryptosporidiosis. Eur J Epidemiol. 
2007;22(11):805-11. 
25. Garvey P, McKeown P. Epidemiology of human 
cryptosporidiosis in Ireland, 2004-2006: analysis of national 
notification data. Euro Surveill. 2009;14(8). pii: 19128. 
Available from: http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.
aspx?ArticleId=1912822 www.eurosurveillance.org
News
EMCDDA publishes guidelines on testing for HIV, viral 
hepatitis and other infections in injecting drug users
L Wiessing (Lucas.Wiessing@emcdda.europa.eu)1, H Blystad (hans.blystad@fhi.no)2
1.  European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), Lisbon, Portugal
2. Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo, Norway 
Citation style for this article: 
Wiessing L, Blystad H. EMCDDA publishes guidelines on testing for HIV, viral hepatitis and other infections in injecting drug users. Euro Surveill. 
2010;15(48):pii=19735. Available online: http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19735
Article published on 2 December 2010
On  1  December  2010,  World  AIDS  Day,  the  European 
Monitoring  Centre  for  Drugs  and  Drug  Addiction 
(EMCDDA) published guidelines on testing for HIV, viral 
hepatitis  and  other  infectious  diseases  in  injecting 
drug users (IDU) [1]. The new guidelines recommend a 
strategy to increase the uptake of testing for HIV and 
other infections among IDU in Europe and beyond. This 
would enable earlier treatment of infected individuals 
which lowers the risk of further spread.
Provided  testing  is  carried  out  with  informed  con-
sent,  with  pre-  and  post-testing  counselling  and  the 
confidentiality of test results can be guaranteed, the 
guidelines recommend that IDU should be offered the 
following tests regularly (depending on infection risks 
this can be up to once or even twice per year):
•	   serology  tests  for  HIV,  hepatitis  B,  hepatitis  C, 
hepatitis D (if there is evidence of chronic or recent 
hepatitis B), hepatitis A and syphilis; 
•	   swab for culture from abscesses and skin lesions; 
•	   biochemical  tests  (to  determine  levels  of  alanine 
aminotransferase  (ALAT),  aspartate  aminotrans-
ferase (ASAT) and bilirubin); 
•	   other  general  blood  tests  (to  determine  erythro-
cyte sedimentation rate (ESR), levels of C-reactive 
protein  (CRP)  and  haemoglobin,  and  white  blood 
cell count); 
•	   tests for tuberculosis. 
The uptake of testing for HIV and other infectious dis-
eases among IDU is still often low in Europe (EMCDDA 
unpublished  data).  IDU  remain  a  relatively  `hidden` 
population,  as  they  are  often  not  regularly  in  con-
tact  with  health  services,  and  their  infections  may 
remain unnoticed for many years. Infectious diseases 
are  among  the  most  serious  health  consequences  of 
injecting drug use and can lead to substantial health-
care costs. IDU are vulnerable to a range of infectious 
diseases through a variety of risky behaviours, such 
as needle sharing and sex work, and because of cir-
cumstances such as poor hygiene, homelessness and 
poverty.  
The  guidelines  are  accompanied  by  a  recommended 
package of prevention (including vaccination), primary 
care and referral routines in relation to IDU and infec-
tious diseases. They were developed in collaboration 
with a range of experts and have been distributed to 
professionals  throughout  the  European  Union  and 
worldwide.
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On  29  November  2010,  timed  to  coincide  with  World 
AIDS  Day  2010,  the  National  Health  Service  (NHS) 
Evidence - infections launched its 2010 Annual Evidence 
Update covering human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 
and tuberculosis (TB) co-infection, ‘Seeing the whole 
picture’ [1]. This aims to provide up-to-date evidence 
and expert commentaries related to the epidemiology 
and management of persons co-infected with HIV and 
TB.
In  his  commentary  to  the  current  update,  Jeffrey 
Lazarus of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria provides an overview of how HIV and TB 
infections  interact  and  overlap  and  presents  data 
underpinning  his  argument  that  TB  incidence,  to  a 
large extent, is driven by the HIV epidemic.
The NHS spends several months preparing each annual 
update, carrying out searches to find the relevant evi-
dence  and  finding  experts  to  provide  commentaries. 
The current update will run until 3 December 2010.
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